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AD HOC IAC COMMITTEE (WATCH)

Transcript of Meeting Held in Director's  
Conference Room, Administration Building  
Central Intelligence Agency, on 5 February 1954

Assistant Director, Current Intelligence, CIA  
Mr. Huntington D. Sheldon  
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William C. Trueheart, Office of the Special Assistant,  
Intelligence, Department of State

Brigadier General John M. Willems, Deputy AC of S, G-2,  
Department of the Army

Captain D. T. Eller (USN), Assistant Head, Intelligence  
Branch, ONI, Department of the Navy

Brigadier General Millard Lewis, Deputy Director Intelli-  
gence, Headquarters USAF, United States Air Force

Rear Admiral E. T. Layton, Joint Intelligence Group, The  
Joint Staff

Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz, Special Agent, Liaison Section,  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Col. George R. Hundt, United States Air Force

Col. Howard D. Kenzie, United States Air Force

Mr. Samuel S. Rockwell, United States Air Force

25X1A [REDACTED] Office of Current Intelligence,  
CIA, Secretary

25X1A [REDACTED] CIA, Reporter

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MR. SHELDON: I guess we better go ahead. Any comments on the last Minutes? Since I hear no comments or suggested amendments they will stand approved as circulated.

MR. TRUEHEART: Before I forget it could I report that Mr. Evans will take the torch up next week, and this will be my last meeting, I think.

MR. SHELDON: Well, we will be sorry to lose you, but if that is an indication of his good recovery, we will certainly welcome that.

MR. TRUEHEART: He seems to be as good as new -- quite a little better.

MR. SHELDON: Now we have two pieces of homework that we were dealing with. One was the proposed change to the Preamble and the other was the Air Force's suggestion with respect to the Composition and Organization of the Watch. Which would you prefer to pursue at this time? My own feeling would be, that is, if we could go ahead and hammer out the main structure we have been dealing with we could deal with the Preamble in the general review of the paper, if that is satisfactory? So on that basis let's turn our attention to the Air Force Proposal on the Organization and Structure. The paper circulated, I think, reflects very accurately the general sense of what we thought was proper at the last meeting. Are there any comments on the paper as circulated?

GENERAL WILLEMS: I referred this to the people working in this field over there. They said that they felt it would be much better if instead of trying to break down the people in the Indications Center into indications people, administrative and clerical people if we sort of placed them in one group to be organized as the Chief of the Secretariat, or whatever we want to call the head of the working people there to organize as he saw fit. They were disturbed over the implications here that you would have a kind of a white collar group who wouldn't want to do the low level jobs over there, and they said frankly that there was no place for anyone like that in this watch set up.

MR. SHELDON: Which would they label "white collar" in this?

GENERAL WILLEMS: The Indications Group. They say that people are going

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to have to do administrative work, and drafting work, etc., that it is very hard to differentiate between them.

MR. SHELDON: I don't know what was back of the Air Force's suggestion, but my feeling would be that you don't want the substantive people in any sense to be encumbered with administrative functions would be my feeling. I don't know whether that was back of your thought or not.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I don't think you want to make that absolutely exclusive, but I think you want to make that a general rule.

MR. SHELDON: Well, I don't either.

GENERAL LEWIS: Enough of a rule to organize that way. But I don't visualize that this is going to be a union proposition where the members over in the Secretariat refuse to do anything over on the other side and the people on the other side refuse to do anything on this side. It is certainly going to be a cooperative venture, but I think the idea of generally breaking it down into the two because we generally want it that way is a good one. As a matter of fact, I have done it a number of times myself in organizations, and I visualize that that should work. I have done it in a joint organization incidentally.

MR. TRUEHEART: What is the difference between these? What would the Secretariat do other than just typing and stuff like that?

MR. SHELDON: They would be responsible for reproduction and that type of thing, logging in.

GENERAL LEWIS: Processing this stuff in, handling it, handling the secret documents, filling out all of these secret forms, and all of this stuff you have to do.

MR. SHELDON: Don't we have our own shop so organized that everybody has, in effect, a split in their own shop?

MR. TRUEHEART: Sure.

GENERAL WILLEMS: No, no, we don't. We can't afford the luxury of that.

MR. SHELDON: Isn't it a fact that it exists whether it has a name or not?

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GENERAL WILLEMS: No, no, I don't think so, and that was their point which I think is worthy of our giving some consideration as to whether or not we want to be arbitrary about setting up their own organization. Actually a lot of the people they feel who would be in this Indications Group would have to do considerable work on the administrative side and vice versa. There would be pinch hitting once in awhile at certain hours of the night, etc., by certain other people. I should think too that we are getting a little bit into the details if we have the IAC set up this minutiae in the group. I should think we would allow the Secretariat and the Watch Committee itself to more or less organize its own Indications Center there. I think they will probably do it anyway.

MR. SHELDON: It seems to me it is a little more clear-cut on this basis.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, theoretically it looks pretty good.

MR. SHELDON: Don't you . . . When you get down to brass tacks finally somebody has got to set up a T/O. Somebody has to write Missions and Functions, etc., and to justify the bodies, and don't you, in effect, end up by allocating certain responsibilities to individuals?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, I think that is done where you think it has to be done for other people. Here there would be a question in my mind as to the propriety of our trying to get this far down.

MR. SHELDON: Well, I must say that the idea I thought was clean cut and appealed to me as a guideline to how this thing should be set up, and I do think it is our obligation to set the guidelines. I would consider this just a broad guideline.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Mr. Chairman, you remember sometime back we considered just how to approach the problem, and it appeared one in which we might go a certain number of steps in one direction and then possibly overtake it in another direction. The number of people has not been considered in any detail.

MR. SHELDON: No.

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CAPTAIN ELLER: And it is very easy to agree with the general organization until we get down to where we are talking about numbers of people. If this is one or two people in each one of these groups it would appear to me most practical to put them into a single unit and have a paper that would determine the allocation of jobs; in other words, each billet would be described. If it is a large number of people, then I think that a breakdown of this type would be perfectly appropriate and would fill the bill. It still isn't clear in my mind the numbers, and I don't think we have had any agreement on the size of these boxes, the number of people that would be employed in those. Based on experience of what the Watch Secretariat does, I think General Willems' point is pretty well taken that if the Indications Group was a group in addition to the people presently in there, and they were going to concern themselves only with operations and analysis, they might find that they did not have enough to keep them fully occupied, so it would appear again better to put them in the same box and allocate the duties within that group.

We now have the pretty detailed tentatively approved duties of the Working Group and/or the Watch Committee. Possibly that might help us arrive at a consideration of numbers and give some key to the size of these groups.

MR. SHELDON: To carry out the responsibilities that we have so far agreed on it can't be done by one or two people, I wouldn't think.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Mr. Chairman, I thought of a compromise solution. I don't know whether it is good or not. Do the same thing you have here only you put a complete box around the two in the pyramid below and start that off by calling the Indications Center with a Chief, and under him Indications Group, so you clearly indicate that they are all part of one package, and then you have an Indications Group and a Secretariat. I have no pride in draftsmanship, but --

MR. SHELDON: Well, that is what is implied here.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: It might satisfy the objections, and I don't draw a full line down between the Secretariat and Working --

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MR. SHELDON: I don't know why you should say you are not a beautiful draftsman. That is 3-dimensional.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I only use that because a 3-dimensional draft shows they are all in one block, that they aren't separated, and if it is a question of who gets what coffee, they wouldn't be fighting of who gets how many cups, and believe it or not I have seen that done sometimes. In other words, we will use General Lewis' scheme but put a box around it and put them all in one hole.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, this has brought out several things. I thought one of our greatest difficulties here was seems to have been in the past of trying to pin down just exactly what we are going to do rather than leaving it fuzzy, so the reason why I divided this thing up was not for any other purpose than making it pretty clear that there were two separate tasks to be performed. There was an administrative task, and there was the other, and I don't as far as I am concerned care particularly except for one concept which I am afraid I don't quite agree with, John, and I think we have had quite a bit of experience in the Air Force to back it up, and that is that without making prima donnas of the Working Group that if we can get the right number who will be fully busy. Those people are out to spend their time doing the analysis work and the work in contact with their home offices, that is, with their respective services, and they should not be spending their time doing administrative pick and shovel work, and I can visualize that you can get the men allocated here in such a way that they would all be fully busy -- maybe too busy -- on both sides, and you could still have your fairly clean separation.

I think that the fear there may arise from the fact that some folks now find themselves having to do administration. I think that is a slightly wrong concept to think in terms of your highly qualified people wrestling with very much if any administration. Now I wouldn't tell them that they mustn't do any, or anything like that, and have this guy over here working until 12:00 o'clock at night maybe if one or two people over on this side, if these people were going home at 4:30. No, nothing like that, but I think

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we can separate the two, and I think they generally should be separated. In summary I don't agree with high paid highly qualified analysts doing administrative work. I don't think that is right. I don't think it is in our best interest to have them do administrative work, and I think we ought to set the thing up so that they won't be expected to do -- primarily expected to do -- it.

Now they may have to do a little filling in, and I would hope these people would all be personalities that would all work together and get the job done. For the purpose of establishing the thing, I think it should be separated. I don't mind that picture, but the picture doesn't solve the difference in the slightly different concept here, you see. That doesn't solve it, but I think that is a very minor hump we can get over at a later date. I do like the idea of generally leaving it up to whoever organized this thing exactly how to set it up, but I can visualize this thing almost to the last man, and exactly how it is going to work, and if that is what we need to do here in order to make a good paper, fine. Maybe the thing to do is to go ahead with our paper here, and then when we finally get around to reviewing it, back off and say, "Now have we gone into a little too much detail?" And if so we can go back and leave out some of the detail and do a little more generalizing. Yet I think that the detailed discussion has been required to date in order for us to come to a pretty sharp realization and agreement as to just what is going to be done. In any case it is all right. That chart is O.K. with me, but I would like to make that one point clear that I don't agree that an analyst should do much if any administration.

MR. SHELDON: I would subscribe to that thesis. How do you feel, Bill, on that?

MR. TRUEHEART: I certainly would agree that the sort of person we hope to get on the Analysis Group ought not be logging in messages or something like that, but I think there is a continuum between logging messages, let's say, and sweeping the floor, and doing analysis so-called, and I think it is rather hard to draw the line. And I am not sure these boxes might not have a bad effect if you get the wrong kind of people in there who would take the boxes as an excuse for making themselves into an organization

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or something. If you don't mean by this any rigid separation between the two groups, why, I think it is all right.

MR. SHELDON: Well, I personally am willing to buy the three-dimensional box.

MR. TRUEHEART: I don't think this is something of how you are drawing the box is going to help. It is going to depend upon the Chief of the Center making it clear what this means.

GENERAL LEWIS: I think you put your finger on it. Any organization like this in order to make it work you are going to depend upon personalities to a degree, and maybe to quite a degree, and if the guy in there wants to look at a chart and say, "I don't do that," then he is a union worker, and he has no business in this Center, and so we relieve him, and just tell me if any Air Force guy tries to pull that on you. Why, he will be out immediately because that isn't the way we are going to make this thing work.

MR. SHELDON: General Willems, do you still hold to your position, or will you --

GENERAL WILLEMS: I think a good compromise is this 3-D presented here, and I don't think that we are too far apart on this.

MR. SHELDON: You do subscribe fundamentally to the theory that a substantive man should as far as practicable do that type of work rather than logging and administrative detailed work?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Oh, yes.

MR. SHELDON: I think we all agree on that, and again we can't spell it out in a rigid manner.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, but I do believe there is some advantage to sort of leaving something . . . leaving it somewhat flexible to the good judgment of the people who are going to be in there. As General Lewis has indicated, if you have some guy in there who obviously is not the kind of fellow you are looking for, you are going to get rid of him.

MR. SHELDON: I should certainly hope so.

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, that is a very good point there. This business

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of what you do about somebody getting in here that you don't like. I think we probably ought to specify that the Chief of the Center, or the Chairman of the Committee, has some at least rights to recommend removal of individuals who don't fit in.

MR. SHELDON: Don't you think that is automatic?

MR. TRUEHEART: I don't know how automatic it is with a contributed group. I have certainly seen some contributed staffs where the deadheads were allowed to sit around until time to move.

MR. SHELDON: Well, I can cite you a very recent case in this particular group. I think General Willems knows the answer to that, but maybe it never reached you. We were requested to remove an individual. We complied. Now even though there was contrary evidence, we simply accepted the request without any question whatever. Do you recall the case?

GENERAL WILLEMS: No, I don't know that.

MR. SHELDON: It never reached you then?

GENERAL WILLEMS: No.

MR. SHELDON: I never raised any issue. I simply withdrew the individual.

MR. TRUEHEART: It is not that any Agency would not remove a man if asked to do so; it is the Chief of this kind of a group -- contributed group -- might well be reluctant to request that a contributed man be removed.

MR. SHELDON: Then he wouldn't be the right guy to run the Center.

MR. TRUEHEART: I thought it might not hurt to indicate he has some discretion in this matter.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I don't think it is necessary. I think within the job here, Chief of the Indications Center, if he has somebody that is not satisfactory, he merely takes it up to the appropriate representative at his Watch Committee level.

MR. SHELDON: The Chairman simply says, "Look, this guy is not doing the job the way I want to see it done."

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GENERAL LEWIS: I think you have a good point, Bill, but I think it is awfully hard to make any recommendations on it. The reason I think you have a good point, I don't think there is any doubt about it that in any sort of an activity like this and in most of our joint activities that the personality of the individual and his desire to really cooperate and play ball and make a go of something is vitally important. If he . . . that way, then that is better than nothing, and the success of the whole affair is maybe not penalized, but it isn't helped very much. If he just doesn't care, then that is very bad, but trying to tell any of the Services that we recommend to them that they pay particular attention to the personality, and the cooperativeness, and the attitude of this individual is a right hard thing to do. They are supposed to be doing it anyhow, and sometimes they don't do it. Now we might try to take individual action in setting this thing up to try and do that. I think we should.

MR. SHELDON: A preamble puts that obligation on us.

GENERAL LEWIS: But I think we specifically might be able to influence the initial assignments of the individuals so that they will be very cooperative people with good personalities, get along, and will make the maximum out of it, so it is a question of whether you get the right people and you make the maximum out of it, or you make the minimum out of it. Well, for a thing like this, I think that even though in general we try to be very careful with the selection of people for such jobs, I think we have got to even be more careful than normally in this one if we can be, but you can't tell a Service that they aren't being careful, and they aren't going to like it, and it probably won't do any good, so I would say it is a hard one to put down in writing, but it is awfully important. It will make a lot of difference; a lot of difference.

MR. SHELDON: So I take it, in general, then that everybody is satisfied with the composition and organization of the Watch Committee as proposed with the change in the drafting of the box?

MR. TRUEHEART: Put this in as Exhibit A?

MR. SHELDON: (Chuckling)

25X1A [REDACTED] All right, sir.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Mr. Chairman, you have a blank here.

MR. SHELDON: Yes, I was just going to raise the blank part of this, and in the previous drafts which CIA had submitted we had indicated that we would like to furnish that particular individual, and we haven't changed our view on that score.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I support that concept. The JIG paper tabled here supported the concept not only that CIA head such an Indications Center but that it also take over the Chair of the Watch Committee being a Sub-Committee of the IAC which is chaired by NSCID and DCID by this representative of the DCI.

MR. SHELDON: Well, I enunciated certain thoughts along the lines of the Chairmanship at the last meeting which probably was reported to you.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I still want to bring up our paper in that regard.

MR. SHELDON: I think it was all agreed that the Pentagon was the proper locus for the operation, and we ourselves felt that the Chairman should be a Service representative, but we do still feel that in this particular spot we would like to have the right to nominate the individual.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Mr. Chairman, I don't follow your logic. I don't think where it is has anything to do with where the Chairman comes from.

MR. SHELDON: Well, I think there was a feeling here, and I would tend to subscribe to it, that there was some advantage in propinquity.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I would just like to have the record show that I haven't changed the position of the JIG paper and think the Chairman of the Watch Committee should be from the CIA, and the same way the DCI chairs the IAC, which is the parent Committee. Since the CIA is by law the principal intelligence advisor to the NSC and the President, why this comes right down the chain.

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GENERAL LEWIS: What we have done actually is to leave that open, and I think that is best to leave it open, but I --

ADMIRAL LAYTON: We are making recommendations, General, in accordance with the action by the IAC, and if we make recommendations I would like to have the recommendation that the CIA chair it if it is nothing more than one man minority view. I can't ascribe to agreeing, nor did any representative agree the other time that such a recommendation was not unfeasible.

MR. SHELDON: Well, couldn't that be handled or be reflected in a letter of transmittal or something of that sort for the final report?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I merely want the record to show it.

MR. SHELDON: Is anybody contrary minded to the suggestion that I made? Does anybody have any serious objections?

GENERAL WILLEMS: My only reservation would be the one I thought along of our coming up with rather rigid requirements on the IAC, whether we should definitely spell out, and I think the same reservation holds with regards to the Chairman perhaps in my mind, whether or not you want to really tell the IAC who they have to appoint in various assignments or whether that should be left --

MR. SHELDON: Well, in this particular instance there is a line of responsibility in a sense, and we feel strongly that we should have the right to appoint that particular individual. We feel very strongly on that score. And per contra we feel that we should so advise the IAC.

GENERAL WILLEMS: As to the competence or the ability of the guy coming from any one of the organizations, I certainly have no reservations there because I am sure we would find a man who would be competent to do the job regardless of where he came from.

MR. SHELDON: Well also there is the problem of continuity, I think, which is very important in this particular slot. I am not taking it two or three years; I am thinking of longer range.

MR. KUERTZ: I think that is a point we have to watch. I have no objection to your request there, but the only thing our reservation should be

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to avoid someone with strings attached to him such as under military requirements or Foreign Service. It would require a transfer outside of this group or body. I have no objection to you --

MR. SHELDON: Well, for the record I would like to insert the letters "CIA" in that blank if it is agreeable to the group.

GENERAL LEWIS: I will agree to it.

MR. SHELDON: In reviewing the work that we had done in the last several sessions, we wondered whether we needed a final catchall paragraph which might read along these lines: "And perform such additional tasks as shall be required by the Watch Committee." In other words, we have tried to spell out the specific responsibilities at each step, and simply to tie the responsibilities down finally in case we had per chance omitted some as we went along, I simply suggest that we might add a final catchall sentence. How do you feel about that?

GENERAL LEWIS: I have no objection to it.

MR. SHELDON: Does anybody object to that concept? I simply wrote down here, "perform such additional tasks as shall be required by the Watch Committee."

GENERAL WILLEMS: To be inserted in fine print?

MR. SHELDON: I wouldn't suggest that it come up at the top, but --

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Mr. Chairman, could I review k. with the Ad Hoc Committee? I have done a little homework on that, and read the Minutes, and reviewed it with the representatives who sat in my place, and I think it is a very good paragraph, but it isn't quite clear as it is written in my mind, and it might be unclear to others.

MR. SHELDON: I am glad you raised that because at the last meeting we had a little difficulty with it, and we sort of accepted this as a temporary solution.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Could I give you the results of my homework?

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I don't claim any pride of authorship, but I think it

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may be clearer to guys like myself who would read it, and insert where you say "concurrently, but not as a substitute for current methods of analysis and evaluation, develop and test" and then "the application of" followed by "mechanical aids and techniques" and insert again "to the problem" followed by "on an experimental basis with a view . . . " You insert after test or between test and mechanical aids in line two the words "the application of". And the words mechanical aids and techniques, after techniques insert "to the problem". I think that in my mind at least spells clearer what they are trying to do. Rather than test the aids you are testing them on the problem and their use.

MR. SHELDON: I think that is helpful. Any other comments on the suggested change? I think that clarifies the concept.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, I think it is certainly what we intended.

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

MR. TRUEHEART: As long as we are on this particular paper, I would like to say that I find c, d, and e quite confusing. They seem to overlap each other greatly, and I don't have a concrete change to suggest, but I dare say that we will have one later on.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I have a very minor worry about c. which I would like . . . If you don't have something specific, I do have something specific. I am a little bit concerned about the implication in c., third line, starting with "evaluating where appropriate." There is an implication there that I would like to make clear that it might be all right for someone to extract and hold something for evaluation and then forward it when he gets around to it, and I don't think that is what I am thinking about. What I am thinking about is that they should promptly extract it and immediately forward it. Now the evaluation that they do on it is something that may or may not delay the forwarding. If it should delay the forwarding, then I don't think that it should. I think that it should be transmitted to the Center so that all of the other members can take a look at it and say, "Well,

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that ties in with something else that I know about," or "That will stimulate me to do something in connection therewith." So what I am dickering with here is to take that "evaluating where appropriate" out of there and make it very clear that they will "promptly extracting and immediately forwarding."

Now the question of evaluation could very well be handled in a separate sentence, if necessary, but the gist of that has got to be that they will also evaluate but not delay the forwarding for such evaluation. However, the evaluation is covered down below, isn't it, actually in e?

MR. SHELDON: I think e . . . I see your point. In practice what would happen, we are talking about multiple copies. You want to get the copy to the Center so that an immediate evaluation can be made across the Board in the Center. In the meantime with the other copies the Home Office, for instance, is starting a deep Home Office evaluation. That is really what in practice would happen, isn't it?

GENERAL LEWIS: I am not thinking so much about the Center doing the evaluation as I am the Center being the place where information from one activity will prompt something on the part of the others when they get a look at it, and that is one of our great problems right now. You have to get together jointly in order for someone to say, "Well, that means something to me; I have something that ties into that," and the two together then would mean something, or it might prompt some action back through another Agency in a collection manner, you see.

MR. TRUEHEART: How would this be to strike "evaluating where appropriate" and then strike d? It seems to me you can strike d. altogether, and then you have arranging for systematic screening and forwarding the stuff to the Indications Center, and in e. you develop an evaluation of it.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: May I interject, Mr. Chairman?

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I think General Lewis' point is excellent, and I think that the idea of an additional sentence that you want the evaluation from

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the initial receiving agency sent on as soon as possible thereafter, but if you consider that e. is an evaluation -- that is a Center evaluation -- which they must develop, but you want to have the benefit of the Home Office analysis because within the realm of reason we have the best that we can get. Well, we have the best that we can get. You have to use them. Otherwise if we have a coterie of them, then we can get some of them over in the Center, but it isn't my thought the Services are going to cut loose with some of their best over to the Center and then be cut back at home. You want first their evaluation. All right the Center comes to the evaluation that might be contrary. Then that is where your working member goes back and discusses with this analyst who lives with the problem more intimately on a day-to-day basis than he does, and they may then develop a further evaluation. There may be some pluses and minuses that haven't been seen, and I think all of the stages of this where you have to use all of the brains in the evaluation is the most important point. Without that the Center becomes a skeleton that is all.

MR. SHELDON: I think that concept is right.

MR. TRUEHEART: The major difficulty I have is that d. seems to me to be . . . I don't understand what it means if it isn't already covered in c. That is c. and e. together.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I agree with you. I am confused that d. repeats what c. says in a way except c. says that you arrange with their principals in the Watch Committee with each Agency to screen, and then they in turn screen.

MR. SHELDON: Our original thought was that you stimulate the flow through your Home Offices and then query what do you do with it when you get it, and d. was intended to spell out what you do when the flow of material has been stimulated -- actually hits the Indications Center. That was the thought previously.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: A suggestion that would satisfy Mr. Trueheart, and also to clarify this, could we find a synonym for "screen" in d.?

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MR. TRUEHEART: Synonyms won't help me. What I am concerned about is what is going on because in c. you have the IAC agencies screening all the information received by them, and d. says that the group is going to screen exactly the same stuff. You would almost think they would be looking over the shoulder of the man in the Agency doing this job.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: My thought on that, Mr. Trueheart, is this. You get say A. from one area, B. from another Agency, C. from another Agency, and D. from another Agency. Those in themselves to those agencies and to the analysts do not in themselves to him strike the same significant responsive chord that the people in the Center get from A. plus B. plus C. plus D., and that is why they have to continue to screen for indications. Otherwise let us say, for example, that A., B., C., and D. thing that comes from four different agencies the evaluation that is not considered. It is considered as no indication, and it is a furtherance of the turmoil, or the usual actions, or expected reaction, but in the Center they say, "Well, we think there is a tie." This starts to form a trend or a pattern -- mostly a trend -- and there is where if they didn't screen it for that purpose, it would be according to this, why, since we spelled it out almost how they chew their food, it would lie fallow. That is why I was asking for a synonym which would satisfy what they do.

MR. SHELDON: Process?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Review.

MR. TRUEHEART: What is worrying me, I think, is this wording, "received by the agencies".

GENERAL WILLEMS: May I say something? I think in c. we are talking about the over-all intelligence take of all the agencies, but in d. we are beginning to talk about the Watch Committee function, screening the pertinent intelligence, that is.

MR. TRUEHEART: Couldn't we just say "from"? If we changed "by" to "from" my problem would evaporate.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Oh, but it isn't. You missed the whole point there.

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What we are trying to do is to have these people actively interested themselves in their agencies to insure that all of the take of their agency . . . so that we have the net result all the intelligence take of the whole IAC community is screened for indications intelligence. That is a very strong point that we worked very hard to get in there.

GENERAL LEWIS: And I really believe in it, Bill. I really believe in it. And if you think it is a tendency to look over a shoulder, then I like it because maybe that's what it might be. It is not going to be an interference. I don't consider it that.

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, how can it be done?

GENERAL LEWIS: Oh, it should be done. The thing that concerns me the most is that this becomes an isolated Center in a vacuum, and that is what it mustn't be -- it mustn't be.

MR. TRUEHEART: I am not favoring that.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, that is what you will tend to get if you try to make it too clean-cut as to exactly the demarcation of the Center and the others. Now we generally said what the people back in the Agencies were to do, but there has to be a tie-in. Actually in my opinion there ought to be a little bit or more of overlap to get all of these people working together the best, which isn't going to I don't think hurt any command prerogatives or anything like that. It is just a question of trying to keep these people working together closely, and it is going to be the Air Force man in the Center working closely with the Air Force people back in his place, and I don't think there is going to be any confusion about it, and I think it is an awfully good point myself.

MR. TRUEHEART: Let's take a very simple example -- telegrams -- Air Force telegrams. Are you going to send the ones to the Center that they should have, and then are you also going to have somebody looking at all Air Force telegrams from the Center?

GENERAL LEWIS: From the Center, oh, no. As a matter of fact, I visualize

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when our Air Force man spends a certain amount of time back in the shop he may have a pile of things that may have some indications implications, and he may look through those things. That is where you get your tie-in. You see, he has been working with all these other folks in this Center, so he has got somewhat of a joint -- more than a joint -- an intelligence community approach to this business. Something in one of these things may mean a lot more to him, see, a lot more. It might mean a lot more to him than it does to an Air Force guy who has got Air Force blinders on, you see what I mean?

MR. TRUEHEART: I agree with that, General, and I agree with your point that we want to have the Agency member of the Watch Committee going back into his own Agency and seeing that everything that is there that is useful gets to the Center, and that we bring to bear his intelligence community point of view and all of that, but that isn't what this says. This says that the group is going to screen everything that is received by the Agency, and I just don't see how that can be done unless you deliver the material to the group because the group can't be brought to the material, and in all five agencies at one time, and so it seems to me that we really have duplicated the two -- have a complete duplication between c. and d.

GENERAL LEWIS: What is worrying you then is how it is implemented and the fact that it might be implemented in a way that is different from what I just related?

MR. TRUEHEART: If I was the Chief of the Center and got this as a directive, I wouldn't know what to do.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Couldn't that be clarified saying in c. "arrange with the IAC agencies for their screening of all intelligence information"? That would answer your objection because that means --

MR. TRUEHEART: I find c. perfectly clear. What bothers me is d., and it really comes to that word "by".

ADMIRAL LAYTON: The "by" . . . if you don't have it "by" . . . if you have "from" you have no control. This way this is not only to the Working

Members, General, as I look at it, and this is another reading. This is a responsibility not only to the Working Member, but it is also to the Watch Committee. That means the Chief of Intelligence of the Service has the responsibility of screening the cables that his Working Member might not see. This comes back to the sensitive stuff we were talking about before. You not only have the Watch Committee member, but you have the Working Member. Both are charged to see to it that any intelligence that is received in their Agency is provided to the Center. I thought you had difficulty with "for a systematic screening" . . . "to arrange with the IAC agencies for a systematic screening . . . "

MR. TRUEHEART: I don't have any trouble with that. I think if you say "arrange with the Chief of each IAC agency for a systematic screening", but what bothers me when you get to the next point then you say . . . In other words, you have gotten the agencies to screen the material and send it to the Center, and then you say the group is still going to go and screen all of that same material.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: In other words, you want to change "by" to "from" in d?

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I agree with you. I thought you were changing c.

GENERAL LEWIS: Now you see what you do when you change it to "from". You isolate this Center in such a way that there is nothing that pulls this Center together with these their home offices, and you get a desirable overlap of the two, and I think that is a very important point.

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, let's add another sentence that "each", or somewhere in here say that "each member of the Watch Committee shall have full access to material in his own agency and shall personally assist in this work of the screening" that we have asked for here. But let's don't give the group a job which they simply cannot carry out.

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GENERAL WILLEMS: Well now wait a minute. We don't want to set up

all the screening of the IAC take by just members of the Committee. What we want is for them to arrange so that all of it is screened for them.

MR. TRUEHEART: I understood that. I am not suggesting we do that.

You say you want him in the act too. I say let's put down in so many words that the Working Group members shall be in the act or however you want to put it. I cannot see the Group screening even all the pertinent intelligence information received by all the IAC agencies.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I see your point.

GENERAL WILLEMS: If they can't do that then we haven't set up the right sort of an organization here. By pertinent we think of indications intelligence which the agencies have delivered over there or sent over, and I don't think it is so much that they can't.

GENERAL LEWIS: I think you are talking about something else now. I don't think you two are together. I think what Bill is thinking about is the possibility that the Chief of this Indications Center will say that that means that we must screen everything that everybody gets. That is what you are reading, isn't it?

MR. TRUEHEART: Everything pertinent; that is what it says.

GENERAL LEWIS: Everything pertinent that everybody gets, and that to do so we would have to maybe go as a body and visit each one of the activities and look over everything that they do.

MR. TRUEHEART: I would certainly think he would have to have his own man in each Message Center at the very least.

GENERAL LEWIS: Not in the Message Center. My concept is he is going to have his own man back there with his respective service on a daily basis, and that is the only way in the world you are going to get a tie-in, a closer tie-in, between the service and this Center.

MR. TRUEHEART: I am all for that; I am all for that.

GENERAL LEWIS: Now is that --

GENERAL WILLEMS: I don't see that. I don't see how one man in any

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agency is going to be able to handle this.

GENERAL LEWIS: No, I am not saying that, John.

GENERAL WILLEMS: What we have to do is get the agency, the whole intelligence part of every IAC agency, to screen their intelligence take for indications intelligence.

GENERAL LEWIS: Right.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Then that in turn is sent to the Watch Committee, or the Indications Center, whatever you want to call it.

MR. TRUEHEART: And that is c., right?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, when it arrives there, and then d. is what directed to this Indications Center, to continually have some sort of a screening or processing of all of that indications intelligence which comes in there.

MR. TRUEHEART: Then the word should be "from", shouldn't it?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: "From" in d.?

MR. TRUEHEART: From IAC agencies in accordance with c.

GENERAL WILLEMS: We have hassled that over, and what was attempted here in d. was to keep the phraseology so that we didn't make it or the Indications Center sort of dependent on what you might call the whims of the agencies. In other words, it wasn't just what they would choose to send them. The responsibility was put on them that they had to see to it that they screened all the indications intelligence that they did get.

MR. SHELDON: You see, we went through this before, and the whole reason we put "by" in was to make it an active instead of a passive activity.

GENERAL WILLEMS: You were the leader of that session.

GENERAL LEWIS: I bow to you, John. In any case I think I have said in detail now what I believe in, and I think it is important now. Now I am not quite so sure though that I get the mechanics as to how what you are talking about is going to work. Maybe I haven't tuned in on you exactly here on the mechanics. Now I have told you exactly how I think mine would work, and I think it is awfully important, but now when you are talking about this

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you are talking about an overlap of some kind here. Now the question is: Where is this? Where do you visualize this overlap, and how is it going to work? My overlap is based on respective representatives going back and being in close contact and actually maybe double checking what goes on back in this Agency and saying, "Well, perhaps you missed one. Here is something that means something to me. It doesn't mean anything to you?" I think that is maybe a double checking process, but now how do you mean for this thing to work?

GENERAL WILLEMS: I don't object to that. I think that is part of this energizing that we will expect from each member of an agency, each representative there who is working on this, but I think perhaps there may be a little bit of difference here. We have two parts of this working organization. One is the Watch Committee member from the Agency who is the energizer, and then we have this Indications Center, and I believe in d. we are really talking to my mind more about the Indications Center than we are the watch representative from the Agency.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, now let's say that each Agency does a certain amount of screening and sends it over to the Center. They review everything that is given to them. Do you visualize that anything is going to be done beyond that to pick up other bits and pieces back in an agency that the agency didn't choose to send?

GENERAL WILLEMS: The Watch Committee representative through his influence would have to insure that the continuous process went on to be sure that all indications intelligence was developed and passed over to the Watch Committee.

GENERAL LEWIS: He may have seen it, and he may not have seen it, but what I am trying to do is to with the tie-in between the two pick up a few bits and pieces which have been missed, you see, and stimulate a close relationship. Now, therefore, when you say to screen all, the only other way that they could screen all in the Center is to get everything that everybody gets in their home offices. Now you don't mean that do you?

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GENERAL WILLEMS: No, no, I mean . . . to my mind let's put it this way. d. is talking about the continuous screening process that we have in the Indications Center, and while we didn't want to say it here, it is whatever comes in through the slot into the Indications Center from the various agencies as I see it.

MR. TRUEHEART: But you don't want to say that.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: He just said, "from the . . . agencies."

GENERAL WILLEMS: We don't want to say it. Look, I didn't care whether you said "from" or not. I am willing to buy "from", but all of us decided here in the one meeting, and I remember this one meeting very clearly in which we . . . We wanted to be sure that we set up an aggressive organization, that everybody in there was going to be fighting for indications intelligence out of the various takes, and that was when we tried to write this in. Now when you go back and read it again, if it doesn't say what we mean to say, I think we ought to change it.

MR. TRUEHEART: My recollection of that, argued against it at the time. I never positively concurred but did desist after a certain length of time.

MR. KUERTZ: Well, General, I will say I left that discussion too thinking it would be "from", but as we are going along now to get to "from" here, but I think to meet your point it has to be inherent. I don't know; we can write it that the people that are selected have got to be of that energizing makeup to give us what we are going to go after. It is like the prerogative of somebody here to fire some Chief if he isn't putting out, and I think it is going to have to be that agency's representative to do that energizing. I will have to go along with Bill on this d. that it will only lead to confusion the way I see it. And, frankly, I thought we had more or less gone along on "from" after all the pros and cons.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Mr. Chairman, maybe it would help if we go into a little bit more the point the General is making, and I know specifically the word "by" was not unintentionally put in there, I mean when we had gone into a certain amount of detail. I don't quite follow what we are

attempting to do with words which apparently we have been unable to do in the past. To be explicit I checked the other day with the Secretariat, and I find there are only two activities that contribute -- the Navy and G-2 -- directly from their daily take. The rest of the items come in through the normal G-2 communication channel, or they come in at the Watch Committee meeting, and the understanding I have is we are attempting to get continuous flow of items rather than a flow once a week.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Right.

CAPTAIN ELLER: And we are trying to get all of the pertinent items which I think we have agreed on pretty well and understand. I don't understand why we can't get that with existing mechanism that we have if that is what is wanted except in the case I understand the AEC's problem, but the rest of the people that are attending . . . I control completely over there in the Navy's output as to what will go in and what won't. Every time I see anything I push it to get the people to get it down to the Watch Committee, and I have eight assistants who work directly and are alternate members who work directly with me, and in turn each one of those has a number of people working subordinate to them who also push any items right up to the top as soon as they become recognized. I had the feeling that each Agency can do that now, and I feel we are trying to write something in here which is not quite what it says.

MR. KUERTZ: The way I read this the Center would do exactly what you and your expanded groups there are doing.

MR. SHELDON: No.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Well, that was not the intent of the way it was written. The intent was for us to pressurize our agencies to get more and more take, but it would appear that we could get it right now if that is it, and it seems to me one of the big weaknesses of the present Watch Committee, and I hope that we will overcome it in the new Terms of Reference.

MR. TRUEHEART: We don't really have a Center yet.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Well, we have almost the equivalent in a sense.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Mr. Chairman, I recall we discussed this before. I made one statement with regard to this that no matter how you write it you are going to be at the mercy of some Communication Officer, or some Communication Watch Officer, or Routing Officer who handles dispatches at the Message Center.

MR. SHELDON: I think what --

ADMIRAL LAYTON: And reading this "received by" it could be read that a member of the Working Group could continuously screen all messages to see to it that all the pertinent intelligence received by any agency has been forwarded, and even if you had a good many working members in the Center, I know from the mass of communications that are handled that it would be quite a job.

There are any number of cases in which misrouted messages the man handled them; although he has experience he didn't recognize it had implications to intelligence. It was a hidden indication, and that is why it was significant when you saw it later, and you were very upset because you hadn't gotten the message. If they are to go back and screen out the agency's take to see to it that they didn't miss anything, he will spend his whole time over in the Message Center, and he won't be of much use to the Indications Center.

MR. SHELDON: What Millard is trying to get across, and I can see the validity of it, I don't know whether we can write it. His concept is that there must be this constant referral back to the Home Office to check and be sure that they are doing --

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I think it could be written in.

GENERAL LEWIS: We might try it.

MR. SHELDON: I am perfectly willing to have "from" here provided we get the other thought in.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: You get the next one. It shall be the duty of or shall be a paramount duty that members of the Watch Committee/Indications

Center shall continuously check with their parent organization --

MR. SHELDON: -- to insure --

ADMIRAL LAYTON: -- to insure --

MR. SHELDON: And I will buy that aspect of it.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Then you don't say they screen it -- check to insure. I think that is all you can humanly do. You lay on the responsibility this constant flow backwards. It brings up any previous point a man isn't any good to you in the Indications Center if he doesn't come home, and he has to come home every day -- several times a day -- to maintain his liaison with these desk analysts, with these evaluators, and with these estimators, and again with the communications personnel to be sure they are giving them everything.

MR. SHELDON: I think that is fine.

MR. TRUEHEART: That suits me.

MR. SHELDON: Let's see if we can write that one, and I think that will solve all of that question. So we will start by writing from here and see if we can write a new paragraph. Do you want to redictate that, Admiral?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Well, I think what I said was out of context to what we had here. What I said was it would be the duty to do so, and I think we can.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, it would be an inserted paragraph, wouldn't it?

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Because I think what we said here still holds.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Nothing wrong with what was said except from "by" to "from".

MR. SHELDON: I think that is even better because it points up the whole.

GENERAL WILLEMS: The only change we make, we have changed the "by" to "from", is that it?

MR. TRUEHEART: If you could just add an additional sentence in c., couldn't you, that it shall be the duty of whoever you said, the Watch Committee member, or what --

ADMIRAL LAYTON: My recommendation was General Lewis' point about taking the evaluation out so that it gets forwarded first, and c. should follow something along the line that the evaluation of this information shall be forwarded expeditiously, and then you go down to d. continuously screen, and then a new e. I am trying to work up.

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I have a rough idea. "Maintain close and intimate liaison with parent agencies to insure that all pertinent indications intelligence information is passed or is received."

MR. SHELDON: There is perhaps in that sentence the license for an individual of one agency to check on another agency in that first --

ADMIRAL LAYTON: -- parent organization. I said, "Maintain close and intimate liaison with parent agencies to insure that all pertinent indications intelligence information has been received." Doesn't that spell what we mean?

GENERAL LEWIS: Your tense there . . . don't you want . . . has been received?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: That is the follow-up I thought you were expressing.

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, but I was just thinking about the tense -- is passed to the Center? Is that what you mean?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Yes, has been received by the Center.

GENERAL LEWIS: Or has been passed. Is passed.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Is passed.

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Would you read that again?

GENERAL LEWIS: That is very close.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: "Maintain close and intimate liaison with parent

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agencies to insure that all pertinent indications intelligence" and that is where I would say "has been passed."

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, all right.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: "It is passed" would give the idea he went over there to see that it got there initially, and this one is a check-up.

GENERAL LEWIS: But your "has been passed" could be read that if it hasn't been, then what? You see?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: That is then covered with c. -- he is arranging for a systematic screening for the purpose of promptly . . . all information indicating these indications. You see, that is the check-up.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Could say "is being made available to the Indications Center."

MR. SHELDON: That also has a connotation of check-up.

GENERAL LEWIS: That looks pretty good to me.

MR. TRUEHEART: "Is being made available . . ."

GENERAL WILLEMS: "Is being made available to the Indications Center."

MR. TRUEHEART: That is paragraph d., e., or what?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I would recommend e. since it follows up their screening of their own.

MR. SHELDON: Because you have to put them in business first, and then later on after they have been in business they have to be sure and check.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Well, I thought also this checking might follow from screening what they received. They might notice that there was a --

MR. SHELDON: I think that becomes the new e.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I would recommend that it become a new e., or it could be d.

GENERAL LEWIS: John, have we lost anything for you?

GENERAL WILLEMS: No, I think we have beefed it up a little bit.

MR. SHELDON: I think this is an improvement.

MR. TRUEHEART: We are certainly leaving nothing to chance, I think.

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ADMIRAL LAYTON: Well, I like from "by" to "from" because we never set forth now an impossible task. The other one the man could say, "I can't screen all the traffic; therefore, I have done the best I can, and if we didn't get it, well, it is too bad."

MR. SHELDON: Is everybody happy with new e.?

GENERAL WILLEMS: I do have one minor one which I would refer to Mr. Trueheart. We say "with parent agencies." Aren't we still leaving in what you brought up before, the license to go into the whole IAC community? It seems to me that there is a context there that implies all of the parent agencies, that is, all of the agencies of IAC.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Respective parent agency.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Agency.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Respective parent agency. Would that clear it up?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes.

MR. SHELDON: Otherwise I think there is the implication of a policing job where one doesn't belong. We are looking for all kinds of things under the bed to be sure.

MR. TRUEHEART: Why don't you say "maintain, through the appropriate Agency representative, close and intimate liaison with the IAC agency"?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, you don't want to move . . . That is the one thing we want to avoid is moving the watch people away even an echelon from the Committee. We want him to stay right in with his agency.

MR. SHELDON: I think the way we had it before the respective aspect does the trick.

MR. TRUEHEART: I didn't get that.

GENERAL LEWIS: The way we had it before.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: "Maintain close and intimate liaison with respective parent agency." Now it becomes a singular. Then "to insure that . . ."

MR. KUERTZ: "Who will maintain close respective . . ."

ADMIRAL LAYTON: The only way you can read that context of the sentence

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is the man of the respective agency will maintain his own liaison with his agency.

MR. KUERTZ: That was Bill's point.

GENERAL WILLEMS: We could insert "members of the Watch Committee and Indications Center will."

MR. KUERTZ: Yes.

GENERAL WILLEMS: As you originally started out.

GENERAL LEWIS: You don't need it for the Committee do you? It would be members of the Working Group.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I think you need the committeeman too there.

GENERAL LEWIS: He is already going to be in it.

GENERAL WILLEMS: He is one of the guys we are trying to energize, isn't he?

GENERAL LEWIS: He is already working over there. In other words, he is a representative thereof, and he works there full time.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: The Watch Committee representative?

GENERAL LEWIS: The Watch Committee representative is in the organization anyhow. It is the Center man that worries me because he belongs to the Center and not to the Home Office. It is the Center man whom I want to get back there and get together with his people regularly and provide just a little bit of overlap, just to be sure particularly that something that means something -- something that might mean something -- to the Navy doesn't get passed over to the Air Force just because the Air Force man didn't recognize it as being of any interest to anyone else, you see. That can happen.

GENERAL WILLEMS: You bring up another point now that worries me, and that is, have we divided responsibility here on this so that you don't have any one person who is responsible for doing this?

GENERAL LEWIS: No, I have been watching that as we can. I don't think we have usurped any prerogatives or divided any responsibility, and you have

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said "to insure" which is not too specific, and you also have given the impression that this is a liaison job keeping together with the word "liaison" that you have in there. Don't you have that word "liaison" in there somewhere?

MR. KUERTZ: Yes.

MR. SHELDON: Your Committee representative perforce will be spending more time in his home office. In any event that is achieved automatically.

GENERAL LEWIS: He is working there as I see it; isn't he?

MR. KUERTZ: The Watch Committee member?

GENERAL LEWIS: The Watch Committee member is not working in the Center. He is working in the Home Office. He is the Home Office representative, so you don't have to tell him to get together with himself.

GENERAL WILLEMS: He doesn't have to always be working to this end in his Agency. We have nowhere said that the man who was the Watch Committee representative will be full time on purely Watch Committee functions.

GENERAL LEWIS: Oh, well, he won't be.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Of course not; we don't want him to be, frankly.

GENERAL LEWIS: So I don't think you are talking about the Watch Committee member; at least I am not.

MR. SHELDON: I think you are right. It is a Staff Member on the Working Group that we are talking about.

GENERAL LEWIS: In other words, if you said that the Watch Committee member should maintain constant liaison with his home office, it would be kind of saying that you ought to get together with yourself.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Stop playing ball and go back to the office.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, suppose we have a failure to produce an item of indications intelligence from any one of the agencies, and we have another Pearl Harbor, and there is a court martial, and the whole thing hinges on the failure of this one agency to produce the intelligence. Who is the guy who is going to be hung near here in this Watch Committee setup for having failed to insure that?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I wouldn't say "Who is the guy?" I would say, "How many can you count without taking off your shoes?"

GENERAL WILLEMS: That is what I am afraid of.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I think there is not going to be a hanging of one man. There is going to be almost a Russian purge. This is a very solemn responsibility, and don't fool yourself.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I merely use this as an artifice to try to get us to try to lay out here on the table who is really responsible. The only way I have ever been able to insure anything working is to be sure that one guy is responsible. The minute you begin dividing your responsibilities, I find it usually falls between them.

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, John, but look what you are doing. Where you cleanly divide responsibility you eliminate the possibility of any overlap. And what are we trying to do? We are trying to provide an overlap, a slight overlap, don't you see, so the extent that it might actually get you into an overlap of responsibility is possibly a little bit, but it is so small that I would be willing to take a chance on that one.

GENERAL WILLEMS: All I am interested in is trying to get the setup so we will know their work, and if we go charging a lot of guys with getting the thing done you are like a sort of nervous commander who tells somebody to do something, and then he gets apprehensive and gets somebody else working on it, and then he gets working on it himself, and you end up without the job being done. Somebody it seems to me has to have the responsibility in the Watch Committee setup here for making absolutely certain that each agency produces all of the indications intelligence to the Watch Committee function that it receives.

GENERAL LEWIS: Don't we have it?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Don't we have that in c., and isn't this thing here merely a checker upper to see to it that --

GENERAL LEWIS: That is all.

MR. TRUEHEART: It seems to me if it isn't clear we ought to make it clear that the IAC members are responsible for seeing that these procedures

called for in c. are established. They are the only people who can discharge such a responsibility, and we ought not to water it down, I think, in any way.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I don't think it is watered down. I think when the IAC meets on this Ad Hoc Committee's Report and approves it, or in whatever form it is approved, they have set their sea lines, and they must by their own office as a member of the IAC do everything in their power to comply. And I don't think you should write down here that the IAC will carry out its duties or the members of the IAC will carry out their duties. I think that is implicit. Just read the mission. The mission tells you what this thing will do.

MR. TRUEHEART: No, I think there is some risk. If you say the IAC agencies will forward all of this material and then at the same time say the Center will see that they forward it, there is some risk that you are splitting responsibilities. Is that what you had in mind, General Willems?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, no, I go down one echelon lower here into the Watch Committee organization and the Indications Center, but you develop another worry here for me. You have got something too there.

MR. TRUEHEART: I think that is the risk of overlap, if there is a risk, that you divide responsibilities instead of decrease your risk.

GENERAL LEWIS: You have used the word "liaison" and what else there?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: "Close and intimate".

GENERAL LEWIS: "Close and intimate" and "liaison" and "insure".

"Insure" is the word that might bother someone, but --

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Well, I was trying to find a better word for "check-up", but I wanted to use the word "check-up". Now "check and ascertain", but that insures if you do that.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, we might think of some better word than "insure", but I am right happy with it at the moment. The only other way you could do it would be to spell out exactly what the purpose of this would be, and that would be kind of long-winded I am afraid.

MR. SHELDON: I don't think that divides responsibility.

CAPTAIN ELLER: We certainly show that we don't have implicit confidence in c. to be effective, so we are putting this one in there to check.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: That is an insurance clause. That is the Mutual Prudential law. The law of c. is made that if it is carried out there will be no collisions, but there are collisions. If you recall Prudential law in the end says that if you are an extremist, no matter what you do, do something, but don't collide, and you can violate all of these laws as long as you don't collide, but if you violate these laws and you collide, you are hung, and that is what this says in here. This is the check-up to see to it that it doesn't happen.

MR. TRUEHEART: That is probably what you need because nevertheless if a given item isn't forwarded blame the Agency and not the Center.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Well, I think that is implicit in any organization because it is the responsibilities of the agencies who are represented in the IAC to meet the requirements of your mission, and if they approve that, that is inherent.

MR. SHELDON: I think we are looking for trouble here. I think the way we have written it now is acceptable.

GENERAL LEWIS: Why don't we keep this in mind, and, as a matter of fact, it is one thing we are still not quite ready to do, and that is to back off from this whole thing and say, "Now what impressions -- what general impressions -- have we given?" I think we are getting close to it, but maybe after another rewriting we can really take a look at the whole business and talk about impressions rather than just talk about words, and I think impressions are going to be mighty important, and that is the last refinement that I think we will have to make. Have we created the proper impressions when people read this thing as to what we really want these people to do to energetically implement this business and to get together with one another and make it work? So when we get to looking at impressions, maybe we have split responsibility, John, but I wouldn't think

so. It might be that we would have to beef up the responsibility to the Agency in some way, but we can see.

MR. SHELDON: Are there any other comments on --

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, we haven't quite gotten this c. business here. I have just tried a hand. If you took out "evaluating where appropriate" in c. so that it would read, "promptly extracting and immediately forwarding." That is a lot of prompts and immediates, but I think it is that important maybe.

MR. SHELDON: Expeditiously was suggested.

GENERAL LEWIS: "Expeditiously forwarding."

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

GENERAL LEWIS: All right. Then in another sentence, "evaluation of the information as appropriate will be forwarded as soon as possible after forwarding."

GENERAL WILLEMS: I wonder if the new f. doesn't really give us all we need. It says, "to develop promptly an early evaluation and analysis of each indication in coordination with the intelligence agency or agencies best qualified to deal with the field of intelligence to which the indication belongs."

MR. SHELDON: I think it takes care of the problem.

GENERAL LEWIS: It is all right with me if you think it is enough. Skip it then.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Mr. Chairman, I would like to address myself to that thought. I still think that spelled out rather than the Agency who receives this information from the field waiting to have developed by the Watch Committee and its Working Group an evaluation. I think that the initial proposal that the evaluation of information be forwarded, or appropriate evaluation, or however you want to put it, soonest, is good because then later on you develop an early evaluation in the Center, and then you coordinate with the Agency. That might be their evaluation that would possibly lead you to a different evaluation within the Center, and you want to go back and

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check with them, and if you don't have that first evaluation from their analysts, their so-called desk experts, you might sit with some wrong information, which their assistance would be valuable and might assist you in coming to a different evaluation within the Center of what is posed and wrapped up with other intelligence. Besides the expert on the desk doesn't have the indications before him. He is working on one job analysis evaluation. The experts in the Center are working on the indications point of view, and I think that way you might lose out. Certainly you are not insuring that you get everything, and I think the intelligence is one thing to insure, but I think the evaluation from the agencies receiving them and their experts probably is as valuable as the basic intelligence.

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, I think you have got something there. You see, you are arranging with them to do these things, and I think you want to put as much responsibility on the Home Office and take the initiative rather than make the Center drag it out of them, so I expect you are right. I expect it would probably be better to leave it in there. What do you think, John? Don't you think so?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, I certainly have no serious objection to that. I had in mind though that in f. we really were putting on the people in the Watch Committee function the responsibility for developing a system for the early evaluation. I certainly agree that we want the evaluation from the appropriate agency, and that was what we tried to get in in the whole c. up there, the original c., and if we feel that it isn't involved in f. and we can't change f. to bring that in, then I would certainly support putting in a sentence to bring it out.

GENERAL LEWIS: Actually we originally started out with this "develop promptly an early evaluation" and was as if one hasn't already been received then. Now it wasn't exclusive of that, but it was most --

Maybe we ought to put that back in there somewhere, but try and get the initiative back on to the Home Office to start this thing, and then if there is more to be done, then the Center would prompt whatever it is that

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needs further to be done.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I would like to give you a specific example of this. We will just say that an Air Force plane on reconnaissance in a certain area sights a submarine, and that flashes in, and we will just say that they have got real good and fast communications, and it comes into Air Force, and it is flashed over here: Submarine has been sighted, oh, let's say, off Kodiak Island. CINCAL has certain sensitivity regarding that area, and we will say other developments have made these things look a little touchy. Air Force says it was a large submarine absolutely identified by everybody. He dove when we saw him. We could see him first submerge and then later we saw him raise his snorkel. We got infrared return. All right, that is fine. Well, say Navy gets a copy of it. Well, that looks pretty hot. They start checking, and the Navy says, "Oh, wait a minute; we have a submarine in that area. It might be one of ours, or it might be a naval report that a Coast Watcher saw this submarine. His evaluation is right away that we have the sea folks in that area conducting maneuvers, so his immediate evaluation would be a great help. You wouldn't start going in a tizzy because a submarine was in the wrong place.

The evaluation to me is one of the most important ingredients.

GENERAL LEWIS: I don't certainly think there is any objection to having it in there, and I think there is an advantage.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Could you add at the end of c. "as set forth in C,2 above" something along the lines of "this immediately followed by Agency evaluation if appropriate." Or you could add, "immediately followed by Agency evaluation." Whether you want to qualify it or not --

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, that is the thought.

GENERAL WILLEMS: You arrange, you see, up there for them to get over these indications, and then you say, "immediately followed", which brings out your thought that you don't want to delay the forwarding for evaluation.

GENERAL LEWIS: That is all right.

MR. SHELDON: That would solve the problem, wouldn't it?

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, I think that is all right.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Could I recommend a thought here? That after the above you put a semicolon and say, "immediate evaluation of the above will be forwarded" or "immediate evaluation where appropriate of the information will be forwarded."

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I think you have got to get the follow-in there somehow because --

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Well, then followed by "evaluation where appropriate." There's the same terms from above. With a semicolon --

GENERAL LEWIS: "Immediate evaluation".

MR. SHELDON: Followed by "an immediate evaluation where appropriate."

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I would suggest leaving out the "immediate". An immediate evaluation is sometimes not good. Followed by "evaluation where appropriate".

MR. TRUEHEART: Shouldn't you say "Agency evaluation" so as to make it clear what you --

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Yes.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Instead of "where appropriate" would it add anything to say "where possible"?

MR. TRUEHEART: It is always possible. You should say something there. Unfortunately, I hate to --

ADMIRAL LAYTON: If they have to evaluate, whether they know anything about it or not, they merely say "No Evaluation", and I have seen a lot of those.

GENERAL LEWIS: Of course, your follow as I use it is in time. Now I wonder if this can be misunderstood the other way that the evaluation will be a part of what they transmit initially?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: The reason I thought that would tie was you make the thing explicit in "promptly extracting and expeditiously forwarding", and then followed by "evaluation" means it is all one series. That is why

I asked to have the semicolon in there to show it is a series of one thought you arranged to have these done.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, as long as it is not misunderstood that "followed by" means later. Of course, if they have got it ready . . . If they have the evaluation ready they will send it along anyhow, so I am not worried about saying, "Later give us the evaluation."

ADMIRAL LAYTON: We get ourselves pretty well tied up if we try to tie the evaluation other than to let them do it. For example, you can say that somebody dropped a stick of bombs and killed 40. Unknown plane dropped a stick of bombs, killed 40. Evaluation: They are real bombs.

MR. SHELDON: What is the language so far? "Followed by Agency evaluation where . . .?"

ADMIRAL LAYTON: "where appropriate."

MR. SHELDON: ". . . where appropriate."

GENERAL WILLEMS: May I suggest a rewording of our e. that we had under consideration here?

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Which we were going to sort of think over? I believe I would be happy if we said something like this there. If we are going to confine it to the Indications Center say, "Members of the Indications Center to maintain close and intimate liaison with respective parent agency to obtain all pertinent indications intelligence for the Center." To change the "insure" to "obtain". I believe it takes away that connotation of overriding responsibility that bothers me but still puts across the thought that we had in mind here.

MR. SHELDON: Check-up, yes. I think that is certainly acceptable to me. How do the others feel? All right, we will accept that.

GENERAL LEWIS: What words have we lost there? We have lost "insure", but he had some others.

GENERAL WILLEMS: "and is being made available to."

MR. SHELDON: In other words, you make it "to obtain"?

GENERAL WILLEMS: "obtain" instead of saying "insure that is being made available to".

GENERAL LEWIS: I want to look at both of those because I am not so sure you haven't made it worse.

MR. TRUEHEART: I think you divide the responsibility seriously there.

GENERAL LEWIS: I think you made it worse there.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Could I ask you to repeat your version, General Willems? I have been busy writing. You said, "Members of the Indications Center . . ."

GENERAL WILLEMS: That is where we want to tie it into the Indications Center -- "Members of the Indications Center to maintain close and intimate liaison with respective parent agency."

ADMIRAL LAYTON: " . . . with their respective parent agency."

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, that will be all right, "to obtain all pertinent indications intelligence" -- that is the way it was before -- "for the Center" or "for the Indications Center."

GENERAL LEWIS: I think you have implied there that there is a responsibility on the part of the Center to go out and obtain it. It depends upon how you read it.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Maybe we can find another word. You don't like the "insure" and you don't like the "obtain". Maybe we better say "check up".

GENERAL LEWIS: It may be that we ought to say "to assist the Home Offices in providing".

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Or "to ascertain that all pertinent indications intelligence is furnished the Center." "Ascertain" is my suggestion for "check up".

GENERAL WILLEMS: Why don't we say "to constantly check that all indications intelligence is being made." I think for them to maintain the check is fine.

GENERAL LEWIS: Is anybody going to resist being checked up on? But if you put it on the basis of them assisting to do their job, that is really

what you are doing. You are assisting them to do a better job.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Some people object to being checked up on. Higher agencies say that we run our business and we don't need to be checked up on.

GENERAL LEWIS: They need assistance though.

MR. KUERTZ: Yes, they need assistance, and I think we can avoid a lot of future trouble if we avoid check up.

MR. SHELDON: Why don't we kind of study that one?

GENERAL LEWIS: Let's do some work on that.

MR. SHELDON: I have one other on this paragraph we were just struggling with. To try to get away from that time aspect that is bothering you on this follow --

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes.

MR. SHELDON: -- if we were to say "by agency evaluation where appropriate" you then have your subsequent technique by developing --

GENERAL LEWIS: I don't want to even imply that it shouldn't accompany.

MR. SHELDON: There will be many times when it may.

GENERAL LEWIS: I don't think there will be very many times, and the thing that worries me, people will say, "Well, they want an evaluation," so I will hold on to it until such time as I can put an evaluation on it. I am not interested in this information getting on through immediately and being available to others who may tie into it in some way and then the evaluation following. In other words, no delay in the report getting through and then saying that an evaluation follows. There are worries both ways. I am less worried about the evaluation getting there than I am about the information getting there in the first place.

MR. TRUEHEART: Could he handle it by leaving it more or less the way it was, but by having a parenthetical phrase at the end or a footnote saying, "In no case will the forwarding of the report be delayed by the preparations of evaluations."

GENERAL LEWIS: I was trying to write that in here in the sentence, but that makes it kind of long.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Well, you could change that, get the thought perhaps by changing some of the adjectives, probably adverbs. That "promptly extracting and expeditiously forwarding" . . . Promptly could be put in terms of immediately extracting. If you say "immediately extracting and forwarding" without putting "expeditiously" in there you are giving the "extracting and forwarding" two connotations, and if you have "immediately" before "extracting and forwarding" I think that brings in the fact that you don't have to say that in case will be delayed, and that is what it says, and any other change --

MR. SHELDON: That is an improvement.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: The problem I see . . . The operational type of messages, they will be all right. You can evaluate those because that is operations will reflect, but the more strategic types of intelligence, they may not be quite apparent right away, and I agree with General Lewis that if you let the Desk Man sit on it, it is generally his prerogative to sit on it and talk to his friend, Joe, and to go down the corridor to somebody else, and he may say, "Well, I want to think this over." The result is the information is held up.

MR. SHELDON: Why don't we try out "immediately extracting and forwarding"? It is a continuous process then which is governed by speed.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I didn't think that was the part that was worrying, is it?

MR. SHELDON: Excepting it is a refinement on what we already have.

GENERAL LEWIS: Take out "promptly".

MR. SHELDON: "Immediately".

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I would suggest putting "immediately" for "promptly" and then taking out the "expeditiously" -- "expeditiously forwarding" -- because you are taking the two different adverbs to describe what should be one function -- extracting and forwarding.

MR. SHELDON: That makes it a continuous immediate process.

GENERAL LEWIS: But we haven't helped the "followed by". We can work on the "followed by".

ADMIRAL LAYTON: May I review it again then. Say "above" and then a semicolon. Then "an agency evaluation, where appropriate, will be forwarded as expeditiously as possible."

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes.

CAPTAIN ELLER: "where appropriate" you leave?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I leave "where appropriate" in there because I think that is a little saving clause.

MR. SHELDON: I think we got somewhere.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: "An Agency evaluation where appropriate will be promptly forwarded." Is that the gist?

MR. SHELDON: Now wait a minute. We are still being governed by rank.

GENERAL LEWIS: Your first one was longer, but I think I liked it a shade better -- "forward as expeditiously as possible." I think that opens it up a little bit more in time and puts a little less pressure on them. You don't want to put too much pressure on them.

MR. SHELDON: I suggest again that we have a recirculation of this paper for a clean look. Frank, will you take care of that?

25X1A [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

MR. SHELDON: This may be a good place to stop.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Mr. Chairman, it might help a little bit. We have several titles under Watch Committee as proposed by General Lewis -- several designations -- and then we have Working Group. We might get those two into agreement so that the next draft would be a little more significant. You remember we were going to try to segregate the Working Group as to the functions of the Secretariat and the functions of the Indications Group. I believe that was the intention.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I don't care whether you call it the Working Group or Indications Group. It makes no difference to me. I think we should agree.

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CAPTAIN ELLER: There are three different terms, and it might be a little confusing.

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes. Indications Group gives it a little bit more of a name, doesn't it, than Working Group? It says a little bit more than Working, so maybe that is the best -- Indications Group?

MR. SHELDON: It suits me.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Yes, that would.

MR. SHELDON: I think that is the right label.

GENERAL LEWIS: We have got all the others pretty well worked, haven't we? It is what you call the Head of the Indications Center, whether you call him a Chief or what.

MR. SHELDON: Chief of the Indications Group or Chief of the Indications Center. There isn't much difference. Thank you, gentlemen.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I wish we had a better title than Chief. In the Navy Chief is the same as Master Sergeant. We always say we have too many Chiefs and not enough Indians.

MR. KUERTZ: Director. Is that too high?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I think that sounds good.

GENERAL WILLEMS: That puts him up on a pretty high level.

MR. TRUEHEART: I have certainly enjoyed being with this Committee.

(There being no further business to come before the Committee, the meeting adjourned at 12:35 P.M.)

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